viernes, 30 de marzo de 2012

Independencia de Banco Central de Grupos de Poder: el Caso de la FED

Interesante nota Who Captured the Fed? de ACEMOGLU and JOHNSON
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Thus was born the idea of independent central bankers, steering the monetary ship purely on the basis of disinterested, objective and scientific analysis. When inflation is too high, they are supposed to raise interest rates. When unemployment is too high, they should make it cheaper and easier to borrow, all the while working to make sure that inflation expectations remain under control.
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Increasingly, however, it seems that technocratic policy-making is just a myth. We have come full circle, and the Wall Street banks are calling the shots again.
In principle, the Fed could stand up to the bankers, pushing back against all specious arguments. In practice, unfortunately, the New York Fed and the Board of Governors are quite deferential to financial-sector “experts.” Bankers are persuasive; many are smart people, armed with fancy models, and they offer very nice income-earning opportunities to former central bankers
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Este es un punto de ocntinua discusión en la academia, pero con importante impicaciones en la vida práctica...y el caso de Banco de México (como muchos otros bancos centrales) no esta exento. Ahora que estamos en elecciones y es un punto en la plataforma de los partidos, bien valdría la pena discutirlo un poco.