El siguiente discurso que ofreció hoy Bernanke en Boston me parece una interesa pieza de discusión sobre el manejo de política monetaria de un banco central antes, durante y después de la crisis. Hace referencia a que el marco que se ha seguido es el de "Objetivo Flexible de Inflación" que define de la siguiente manera
"...During the two decades preceding the crisis, central bankers and academics achieved a substantial degree of consensus on the intellectual and institutional framework for monetary policy. This consensus policy framework was characterized by a strong commitment to medium-term price stability and a high degree of transparency about central banks' policy objectives and economic forecasts. The adoption of this approach helped central banks anchor longer-term inflation expectations, which in turn increased the effective scope of monetary policy to stabilize output and employment in the short run. This broad framework is often called flexible inflation targeting, as it combines commitment to a medium-run inflation objective with the flexibility to respond to economic shocks as needed to moderate deviations of output from its potential, or "full employment," level. The combination of short-run policy flexibility with the discipline imposed by the medium-term inflation target has also been characterized as a framework of "constrained discretion."
Many central banks in both advanced and emerging market economies consider themselves to be inflation targeters, prominent examples including those in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Although they differ somewhat in the details of their policy strategies, policy tools, and communication practices, today virtually all inflation-targeting central banks interpret their mandate flexibly--that is, they treat the stabilization of employment and output in the short term as an important policy objective even as they seek to hit their inflation targets over the medium term. Several other major central banks, such as the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank, do not label themselves as inflation targeters; however, they have incorporated key features of that framework, including a numerical definition of price stability, a central role for communications about the economic outlook, and a willingness to accommodate short-run economic stabilization objectives so long as these objectives do not jeopardize the primary goal of price stability..."
.
Un elemento central en el discurso es señalar que si bien este marco ha sido exitoso en el manejo de política monetaria, una gran limitante es que se descuidó el objetivo de estabilidad en el sistema financiero, por lo que este marco conceptual debe ser ampliado entre otras cosas para abordar este aspecto.
.
Un comentario interesante es el siguiente
...The medium-term focus of flexible inflation targeting also offered central banks latitude to cushion the effects of the financial shocks on output and employment in the face of transitory swings in inflation. In particular, they were able to avoid significant policy tightening in mid-2008 and early 2011, when sharp increases in commodity prices temporarily drove headline inflation rates above target levels...
"...During the two decades preceding the crisis, central bankers and academics achieved a substantial degree of consensus on the intellectual and institutional framework for monetary policy. This consensus policy framework was characterized by a strong commitment to medium-term price stability and a high degree of transparency about central banks' policy objectives and economic forecasts. The adoption of this approach helped central banks anchor longer-term inflation expectations, which in turn increased the effective scope of monetary policy to stabilize output and employment in the short run. This broad framework is often called flexible inflation targeting, as it combines commitment to a medium-run inflation objective with the flexibility to respond to economic shocks as needed to moderate deviations of output from its potential, or "full employment," level. The combination of short-run policy flexibility with the discipline imposed by the medium-term inflation target has also been characterized as a framework of "constrained discretion."
Many central banks in both advanced and emerging market economies consider themselves to be inflation targeters, prominent examples including those in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Although they differ somewhat in the details of their policy strategies, policy tools, and communication practices, today virtually all inflation-targeting central banks interpret their mandate flexibly--that is, they treat the stabilization of employment and output in the short term as an important policy objective even as they seek to hit their inflation targets over the medium term. Several other major central banks, such as the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank, do not label themselves as inflation targeters; however, they have incorporated key features of that framework, including a numerical definition of price stability, a central role for communications about the economic outlook, and a willingness to accommodate short-run economic stabilization objectives so long as these objectives do not jeopardize the primary goal of price stability..."
.
Un elemento central en el discurso es señalar que si bien este marco ha sido exitoso en el manejo de política monetaria, una gran limitante es que se descuidó el objetivo de estabilidad en el sistema financiero, por lo que este marco conceptual debe ser ampliado entre otras cosas para abordar este aspecto.
.
Un comentario interesante es el siguiente
...The medium-term focus of flexible inflation targeting also offered central banks latitude to cushion the effects of the financial shocks on output and employment in the face of transitory swings in inflation. In particular, they were able to avoid significant policy tightening in mid-2008 and early 2011, when sharp increases in commodity prices temporarily drove headline inflation rates above target levels...
.
En lo personal no creo que el Banco de México haya aprovechado este aspecto en el 2008 como lo menciono en mi libro y en otras notas...
1 comentario:
Me parece que la política monetaria con bandas de inflación es una muy buena opción como política toral de un banco central ya que, por ejemplo, el objetivo dual de la FED no permite grados muy altos de transparencia y debido a la discrecionalidad del banquero central los agentes económicos no pueden alinera tan fácilmente sus expectativas a mediano y largo plazo.
Saludos,
Mario Enrique
Publicar un comentario